[RR-2][Draft] Rarible DAO Structure: Community Treasury, Staking for Voting power

it sounds a good mechanism to me @DeFiPeasant …I agree on rewarding participants who casted their vote for an “effective” good proposal, it makes their choice more responsible. It could be possible also to think about some kind of “light” penalization for users who casted votes for a proposal that successfully passed and actually results in an “effective” bad proposal.

I would like to touch to deeper side of the governance in hoping that it can give a better shape;

How did they acquired their RARI in first place?

Either the RARI is purchased, claimed from the airdrop, or in my previous comment where I mentioned maybe if certain percentage taken from the reward pool on behalf of users and locked for the smallest period of time to their addresses, so there are two certain ways and one possible way to enter the Rarible DAO.

How many RARI will they lock and for long will be based on how did they acquired their RARI in the first place and of course factors such as proposal frequency, importance of DAO and rewards from participation will play a role on amount/period locking decision.

WHY do they lock?

If the goal here is to lock as much as of the circulating supply to DAO, that would boil down to reward side which it would encourage users the lock the most.

If the is goal creating a healthy, useful and long-term oriented what some might perceive as boring yet where DAO used for voting on intricate but important key points of the platform to fine tune little details and bit by bit improve the platform, not so much incentivizing rewards where DAO would be more oriented to players who prefer to lockup for the max period with max amount to have more voting power on voting such subjects mentioned above.

Maintaining a delicate balance between two sides(short-term rewards vs long-term results) where it doesn’t lean too much on reward side that results in inefficiency, and not leaning on too much on giving power to interest parties because due nature of crypto that eventually results in collusion & corruption where self-interests come forward is where sweet balance can be maintained.

For example not proposal creation, proposal voting but proposal outcome is where the creator and addresses who casted their vote is rewarded and how does this can be measured?

Proposals resulting in usage of treasury
Proposals resulting in actual change to platform
Proposals resulting in actual change to parameters (such as reward parameters for creators/collectors, DAO, fee, etc…)

Rewarding positive change for Rarible = Rewarding outcome for voters/proposal creator(positive loop)

This way real and actual use case having proposal creation is incentivized and other type of proposals that don’t bring any value is discouraged and a certain level would be established at DAO.

Fees & DAO staking rewards would be distributed pro-rata to gRARI(Activated Rari) and just like weekly rewards to creators/collectors bi-weekly DAO reward distribution to addresses would take place. (Maybe the day DAO is formed can be chosen as the the distribution day instead making it Monday or same as platform reward distribution day)

Taken the current distribution amount between addresses, minimum amount to put a proposal on a vote could be 1000 gRARI, this way a degree would be maintained and whoever doesn’t have necessary voting power could delegate or pool voting powers at key community members to put on the proposal on behalf of them. Here simply if proposal creator have gRARI(Activated Rari) delegated to them, positive resulting proposal result in reward distribution take place pro-rata to delegated amount to people who delegated the proposal creator.


Below are my thoughts/inputs on this:

I think a max. holding period of 12 months is realistic. From this maximum I suggest the following gradations:

1 month
3 months
6 months
12 months

The allocation of voting rights is then exponential, i.e. the longer the holding period, the more voting shares.

I would make the reward as simple as possible, otherwise the interest and the seriousness will suffer. My proposal is that weekly 18’000 RARI are distributed in proportion to the voting rights as a reward under the following condition:

  • Participant must participate in each vote or at least delegate his voting rights to a third party. If this is not met, no reward will be paid for that period. This ensures that an active and growing community can be built.

I am also interested in your opinions and look forward to further comments.

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Amazing thouthgs.
Let’s shape the words on the new liquidity mining program that is already partially staked in a new proposal let’s say RR-5 new liquidity mining program.
The team also has several ideas on how to do that.

This is good. One example of that would be UMA Options when there is a contract that unlocks tokens upon reaching KPI.

My struggle here is how can we measure the connection between a proposal and and outcome?
Might be we can do a flexible terms when at the end of a proposal there is a schedule of rewards ex:

  • If the proposal is accepted then me, the creator receives X RARI for making it successfull.
  • Then in 2 months we’ll have a voting on how much of an input this proposal created: “Low”, “Medium”, “High”. Upon results of this vote me, the creator would receive Y_low, Y_medium, Y_high reward.

What do you think? In general my suggestion is to treat proposal reward as a part of a proposal itself.

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Rewarding successful proposal conclusion and finalization is easy to measure: passing the quorum, voting amount.

Like you said, proposal outcome would require another follow-up proposal after a period of time to conclude if it has been successful or not based on certain metrics.

Hi folks, I don’t know if this is still being actively debated, but here’s my input.

First of all, Activated RARI, which is surely to become an OG of the many NFT DAOs to come, should be named ATARARI, AcTivAted RARI, after of course ATARI, the OG of game consoles :laughing:.
In a community of artists and techies, we should be able to nerd out and laugh a bit :joy:

I think the smoothstep function proposed earlier has some real merits. Plateau finale prevents people doing overly long staking in an effort to gain disproportionate control over governance. With this function the need for a maximum lockup period is almost none. The minimum lockup period could be the minimum needed time to evaluate the efficacy and appreciation of a new proposal over time.

For example, if most proposals take a few weeks to implement and few more to test and really get community feedback, then two months might be a reasonable minimum.

This seems like a great way to quantify the final sentiment surrounding a proposal.

However if, for example a proposal that had great initial community support and positive intent ended up backfiring during the implementation phase, or later, for XYZ reason, then a well intentioned and supported proposer/voter might get a lesser reward through no fault of their own based on the second vote. People voting for something that seemed great but didn’t work out would be :frowning: not to get full reward.

There could be a dual measurement, at each end of the process, that is then averaged. It might be a great way to compensate that imbalance and incentivize the proposers, and voters, to remain active in the implementation process to ascertain a better outcome for the sake of both their proposal (read community) and their own reward.

If the reward is X. If a proposal was well received, as measured by initial YES vote percentage, let’s say 90%, and fared well enough to maintain a 90% approval rating after a later round of appreciation voting. Then they would get 90% of X.

If the proposal is badly received and it only has 10% approval rating, then the reward goes down to an averaged 50%, significantly reducing the cost of a badly received proposal, while not entirely penalizing the initial proposer/voters who were well intentioned.

On the other end if the proposal barely passes majority, say 50%, then the supporters of the proposal really work in the community to help increase use and acceptance. A secondary vote might yield 90% approval rating and then the averaged value is up to 70% which is significant enough to incentivize action.

It may help to foster voting and proposing towards things that both look good on paper, but are also feasible, applicable and useful, as proposers and voters alike try to vote mostly for things that will stand the test of time.

Inversely, it could encourage people who have made a proposal pass with lower approval work harder towards community acceptance and utilization so as to have a higher approval rating later on and increase the averaged value of their reward above the initial point.

It also reduces spam in way, but as pointed out by a previous comment, ETH gas fee is its own paywall to spam. That could change however, if local proposal to mint in DAI is successful of even just after the July ETH update to lower gas fees.

I hope this makes sense :upside_down_face:, also I know I’m late to the party, but I really like this platform and feel like getting involved in the community :smiley:



You guys are doing a fantastic job.


Great job. I wonder if you guys are working on the move onto Optimistic rollup. Since gas fees for minting has been a huge issue.


RR2 has a few pieces to it, below are my thoughts:

  1. 25% to a Community Treasury: I am in full support of this.
  2. 25% to people who govern: I would hope comes along with:
    A) some sort of rewards distribution mechanism that allows rewards to also flow to delegators (as has been suggested by Pet3r), and B) an abstain function so we don’t incentivize needless voting… I would also be in favor of a lower reward (10% or so), since we really don’t need a heavy incentive here. Most people are incentivized to participate simply because they want the Rarible ecosystem to thrive, and for the most part that is enough.
  3. Some delegation feature for governance. I really like this, and also like the quadratic suggestion by cryptosi
  4. Some mechanism which incentivizes longer term staking. I’m a fan of the exponential option since it’s simple to understand and acheives the goal of longer term locking. 3 year lockup seems like a good timeline to me. A minimum of 2 months is OK, no strong preference here. In terms of naming, I would go with aRARI (just because it sounds better than gRARI).

I’m personally not a fan of penalization and don’t think it is needed (but could be wrong, and should think about this if we don’t see the desired results).

Let’s get this voted on!


This is really good and I agree. If what’s being proposed brings enough value to be accepted, it shouldn’t be difficult to agree upon some way to quantify/measure successful delivery of that value over “x” period of time. I like rewarding acceptance of the proposal itself. Same when raising capital in startup world; getting investment is just as much a part of the success story as going on and executing the big idea over a mid/long-term time horizon. Great points all around.

@hoff_therecord that’s an awesome name. My best friend’s last name was hoff and he used that since AOL.

Anyways: I think it’s fantastic too but is voting still open? It’s not–am I correct on this?

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Not correct my friend . RR2 is still open/active. See here Proposal for Phase 2 of [RR2]

your comment on AOL gave me some inspiration on the creator front - ill post here when I’m done lol

In general I’m in favour of moving to governance model as fast as possible and reducing the emission of RARI tokens, the current 75k per week seems really high.

One question I have is around the platform fees? What’s the plan for those fees?


I totally agree with you!!!

like the idea of JayComtois!!!

hey man–that’s awesome. as an artist there couldn’t be a greater compliment. (picking up from 24 DAYS ago =P)

+1, I agree with this

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Any updates on implementing staking? :smile: